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As the first step to defend against DoS attacks, Network-based Intrusion Detection 
System is well explored and widely used in both commercial tools and research works. Such 
IDS framework is built upon features extracted from the network traffic, which are 
application-level features, and is effective in detecting flooding-based DoS attacks. However, 
in a sophisticated DoS attack, where an attacker manages to bypass the network-based 
monitors and launch a DoS attack locally, sniffer-based methods have difficulty in 
differentiating attacks with normal behaviors, since the malicious connection itself behaves in 
the same manner of normal connections. In this work, we study a Host-based IDS framework 
which integrates features from architectural and operating system (OS) levels to improve 
performance of sophisticated DoS intrusion detection. Network traffic collected from a 






1.1   Overview 
Denials of Service (DoS) attacks impose serious threat on the availability and quality of 
Internet services [15]. They exhaust limited resources such as network bandwidth, DRAM 
space, CPU cycles, or specific protocol data structures, inducing service degradation or 
outage in computing infrastructures for the clients. System downtime resulting from DoS 
attacks could lead to million dollars’ loss. 
Generally, DoS attacks can be either flooding-based or software exploit-based. In a 
flooding-based DoS attack, a malicious user sends out a tremendously large number of 
packets aiming at overwhelming a victim host. For example, in a SYN-flooding attack, a 
significant number of TCP SYN packets are sent towards a victim machine, saturating 
resources in the victim machine. We can observe a surge of TCP connections in a short time, 
which are modeled by a tuple of application features <source IP, destination IP, source port, 
destination port>. In exploit-based DoS attacks, specially crafted packets are sent to the 
victim system targeting at specific software vulnerabilities in the operating system, service or 
application.  The success of exploitation will either overwhelm or crash the target system. 
An existing solution to the exploit-based attacks is to patch and update software frequently. 
 Currently, research work on DoS intrusion detections mainly rely on Network-based 
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) [3][5][6][7][8][10][21]. The NIDSs monitor features 
extracted from network packet headers at the application layer such as packet rate and traffic 
volume. Ramp-up behaviors and frequency domain characteristics are also studied to aid in 
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improving the accuracy and performance of IDS [3][6]. On the other hand, Host-based 
Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs) which widely employ audit trails and system call 
tracking can effectively identify buffer overflow (BoF) attacks [1][2][19]. However, the DoS 
attacks are not easily observed by such an HIDS and not widely researched in the HIDS 
literature. Some researchers have proposed to limit the bound of certain system calls [1] such 
as fork(). However, with the advent of large-scale application software, such bounds may 
seriously impair the performance of normal applications. Moreover, DoS attacks may not 
involve huge number of system calls at all. Therefore, a more generic solution is needed to 
detect DoS attacks. 
When increasingly sophisticated techniques are adopted by attackers, multi-tier attacks 
and IP spoofing are emerging to amplify destructive effects and evade detections. The attack 
patterns or behaviors will be difficult to identify by using only header-based network traffic 
analysis. For example, in a complicated scenario that an attacker gets around the network 
monitoring sensors and launches DoS attacks locally, a NIDS may not be able to detect this 
intrusion. In such a scenario, non-privileged access is good enough to successfully initiate a 
DoS attack against the host machine: once the attacker obtains the access to the victim 
machine, even if it is not root-privileged and difficult to further elevate to carry out other 
destructive or stealthy behaviors, he/she can still easily upload a DoS daemon to massively 
consume the machine’s limited resources. Instead of network information only, information 
originated and resided on the victim machine should be used to track and monitor such 
undergoing attacks in this case.  
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1.2   Major Contributions 
In this work, we propose an HIDS with multi-level integrated information from 
application, operating system (OS), and architecture levels to improve the detection rate of 
sophisticated DoS attacks. Figure 1-1 illustrates the framework of our proposed IDS 
framework. At different levels, we use different tools or schemes to collect and extract typical 
features of possible intrusions. According to our experiments, even if DoS attacks could 
successfully evade captures of NIDS monitors, architectural behaviors will still be triggered: 
tremendous jumps of Instruction Count, Cache Miss, Bus Traffic can be found. Based on this 
observation, a novel HIDS employing a modern statistical Gradient Boosting Trees (GBT) 
model is proposed to detect sophisticated DoS intrusions through the integration of 
application, OS, and architectural features. Our experiments show that the inclusion of 




Figure 1-1.   Framework of multi-level IDS  
 
 4
1.3   Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: background knowledge is introduced in 
chapter 2. Our proposed IDS methodology and framework is elaborated in chapter 3. Chapter 
4 provides the technical details of the multi-level IDS implementation. Dataset generation is 
described in chapter 5. The experiment results are shown and discussed in chapter 6. Related 
work is discussed in chapter 7. We conclude the work in chapter 8.  
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Chapter 2 
Background and Basic Concepts 
 
2.1  Types of Intrusion Detection Systems 
 Intrusion Detection Systems can be broadly divided into two categories: Host-based and 
Network-based Intrusion Detection System. Other types of IDSs could be considered variants 
or hybrid of these two basic types. 
2.1.1   Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) 
HIDS monitors and analyses the internal behavior of a computing system, including all 
or part of the dynamic behavior and the state of a computer system. Event logs, audit trails, 
system call tracking are widely utilized to identify and defend against attacks.  
 
 
Figure 2-1.  HIDS Topology 
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The topology of HIDS is shown in Figure 2-1. Machines labeled in blue are installed 
with the HIDS. Since the IDS is host-based, actual installation on the system under monitor is 
required. Otherwise, the IDS can not gain full access to the internal system information. 
2.1.2   Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
 As opposed to monitoring the activities that originates on a particular system, NIDS 
focus on external information outside monitored target. It sniffers network traffic and analyze 
all in-coming packets, looking for suspicious patterns of malicious connections. 
 
 
Figure 2-2.  NIDS Topology  
 
As shown in Figure 2-2, the NIDS highlighted in blue is usually placed behind the LAN 
firewall. It can be implemented as software, or appliance hardware. It keeps monitoring the 
traffic coming from outside network and within the LAN, and it also analyzes the content of 
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individual packets in search for malicious traffic. To monitor a LAN, only one such device is 
required to install. Comparing to HIDS, NIDS adopts a centralized infrastructure in the LAN. 
2.2  IDS Methodologies 
Signature and anomaly detection are two primary IDS approaches. They have their own 
advantages and disadvantages, and actually, they complement each other in the intrusion 
detection field. 
2.2.1   Signature-based IDS 
 Signature-based IDS employs specifically known patterns of misuse behavior to predict 
potential malicious activities. These patterns, i.e. signatures, could be the number of failed 
log-ins during a certain time frame, or specific patterns matching a portion of network 
packets. 
PROS: Signatures are easy to develop and understand if you know what malicious 
behavior you're trying to identify.  
CONS: Virus database must be constantly updated. A signature must be created for every 
attack, and novel attacks cannot be detected. 
2.2.2   Anomaly-based IDS 
 Anomaly-based IDS is designed to uncover misuse behavioral patterns by examining 
network traffic and system activities. They establish a baseline of normal behavior, observe 
when current behavior deviates statistically from the norm, and flag those activities as 
possible intrusions.   
PROS: Anomaly-based IDS has the ability to promptly detect novel attacks that are 
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unknown or for which signatures are not developed yet.   
CONS: As normal behavior can change easily and readily, there is no standard normal 
behavior profile. Anomaly-based IDS systems are prone to substantial false positives where 
attacks may be reported based on deviations from the norm patterns. 
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Chapter 3  
Multi-Level Intrusion Detection System 
 
3.1  Methodology 
 In our design, we integrate the information which only resides on the host machine under 
attacks, and then construct a multi-layer IDS to detect sophisticated DoS attacks. The 
correlation of system architectural behaviors and DoS attacks is analyzed by a modern 
statistical model employing Gradient Boosting Trees techniques. Architectural features are 
explored to improve the IDS performance. Our proposed scheme involves multiple steps 
listed as follows. 
 Step 1: Data Collection 
We use the tcpdump utility to record header information of network packets 
transmitting towards/from the host computer. Architectural behaviors are recorded using 
a device driver which periodically samples the CPU performance counters and dumps 
out the performance variation trace. System call tracking function embedded in the Linux 
kernel is utilized to record OS level events. 
 Step 2: Feature Extraction and Correlation 
Our desired application level features are extracted using a custom network traffic 
parser which models records by network sessions identified by src_ip:src_port <-> 
dst_ip:dst_port. OS level features are extracted from a system call tracking function 
embedded in the kernel. Architectural records are processed as a ratio of event numbers 




Figure 3-1.  The framework of our IDS 
 
Since features of different levels are obtained by different collecting processes, we 
append a timestamp to each record for the correlation between architectural events and 
application events during the same session. 
 Step 3: Intrusion Prediction 
As a standard workflow, in this step, each correlated record is fed to the statistical 
model which has learned the patterns of normal and attack behaviors from the training 
dataset. It will raise an alert if the given record deviates from normal behaviors. 
3.2  IDS Framework 
 The framework of our proposed intrusion detection system consists of a learning module 
and an inference module as shown in Figure 3-1. The learning module is used to build up the 
knowledge from an offline training dataset. The knowledge base contains a statistical model 
which is learned from observed traffic, and has the ability to predict whether a network 
connection is malicious or benign. The inference module is the analysis engine of our IDS. Its 
task is to process the data collected from the sensors in order to identify intrusive activities.  
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The training set and the real-time traffic include features from different levels as shown 
in Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and Table 3-3. 
1. Application (APP) Feature Set  
Table 3-1.  Application Level Features 
Feature Name Description Type 
protocol_type Type of the protocol, e.g., tcp, udp, etc.  discrete 
service Network service on the destination system, e.g., ssh, 
http, telnet, etc.  
discrete 
duration Length of the connection  continuous 
size_from_client Number of data bytes from client to server  continuous 
size_from_server Number of data bytes from server to client  continuous 
packet_rate Number of two-way packets per second continuous 
wrong_ 
checksum_rate 
Percent of packets have wrong checksum continuous 
 
2. Architectural (ARCH) Feature Set 
Table 3-2.  Architectural Level Features 
Feature Name Description Type 
instruction_ 
retired 
Ratio of average instructions committed during a 
session to a pre-measured normal session 
continuous 
L1_cache_miss Ratio of average L1 cache miss during a session to a 
pre-measured normal session 
continuous 
L2_cache_miss Ratio of average L2 cache miss during a session to a 
pre-measured normal session 
continuous 
bus_access Ratio of average bus transactions during a session to a 
pre-measured normal session 
continuous 
 
We select these features because a typical network DoS attack can be monitored by 





3. Operating System (OS) Feature Set 
Table 3-3.  OS Level Features 
Feature Name Description Type 
forked_socket_session Forked another network connection discrete 
forked_shell Forked shell sessions discrete 
forked_from_shell Forked from another network connection discrete 




3.3  Statistical Model 
The statistical model that we employed for intrusion detection is based on Gradient 
Boosting Trees (GBT), originally proposed in [4]. GBT is one of several techniques that aim 
to improve the performance of a single model by fitting many models and combining them 
for prediction. GBT uses two algorithms: “trees” from the Classification and Regression Tree 
and “boosting” which builds and combines a collection of models, i.e. trees.  
From a user’s point of view, GBT has three major advantages. First, GBT is inherently 
non-parametric and able to handle mixed-type of input variables. Both discrete and 
continuous data are supported. There is no need of data discretization. GBT does not need to 
make any assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of the values for the input 
variables. Thus, it relieves researchers from determining whether variables are normally 
distributed, and making transformations if they are not. Second, the tree is adept at capturing 
complex-structured behavior, i.e. complex interactions among predictors are routinely and 
automatically handled with relatively few inputs required from the analyst. This is in marked 
contrast to some other multivariate nonlinear modeling methods, in which extensive input 
from the analyst, analysis of interim results, and subsequent modification of the method are 
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required. Third, the tree is insensitive to outliers, and unaffected by monotone 
transformations and differing scales of measurement among inputs. Despite clear evidence of 
strong predictive performance, boosting-based learning methods have been rarely used in 
computer intrusion detection [24]. 
 Consider the binary classification problem with n observations of the form {yi, xi}, 
i=1,…,n, where xi is a multi-dimensional input vector and yi is the binary response yi∈{-1,+1}. 
In this paper, xi is the feature in multiple levels and yi is the prediction result, i.e., attack or 
benign connection. The negative log-likelihood for the binomial model or deviance (also 
known as cross-entropy) is used as the loss function: 
( ) ( )( )fyfyL ˆ2exp1logˆ, −+=  
The population minimizer of the loss function is at the true probabilities:  
( )
























where ( )( )[ ]xx fyLEY ,|  is the expectation value of the loss function over Y given the input X.  
 
The detailed algorithm for GBT in binary classification is the following.  
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3) End algorithm. 
Note that ν  is the “shrinkage” parameter between 0 and 1 and controls the learning rate 
of the procedure. Empirical results have shown that small values of ν  always lead to better 
generalization error rates [4]. In this study, we fix ν  at 0.01. During each iteration, an 
H-terminal node tree, which partitions the x  space into H-disjoint regions, { }HhhmR 1= , is 
fitted based on the current negative gradient for the loss function. 
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Chapter 4   
Implementation of Multi-Level IDS 
 
4.1  Overview 
We summarize network traffic captured in a tcpdump file into high-level connections. 
Specifically, a connection is a sequence of network packets starting and ending at some well 
defined points in time, between which data flows under a well defined protocol from a source 
IP address to a target IP address. Before processing the data with the IDS training algorithm, 
raw network traffic has to be pre-processed and summarized into connections or high-level 
events. Each connection is described with a set of features which IDS models can utilize to 
detect possible intrusions. 
4.2  Application Level Parser 
Our modified parser based on an open source utility Chaosreader extracts desired 
information in the application level out from the recorded tcpdump files, and groups packets 
into sessions by src_ip:src_port <-> dst_ip:dst_port, thus we will obtain a set of preprocessed 
data in the format that each entry represents a network connection, together with application 
features flagged accordingly. 
Our desired information is stored in different header levels, thus the parser strips the 
headers level by level, and construct the features we need. 
The workflow of the parser is shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-1.   Network packet header  
 
Figure 4-2.   Workflow of application level parser 
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4.3  OS Level System Call Tracking 
At operation system level, we employ a system call tracking function based on 
BackTracker [9] to record all system call driven events, and related network socket sessions. 
We append a timestamp to every record; add full IP address and port number information to 
all socket sessions, in order to correlate OS events with other level events. BackTracker 
discovers sequences of steps that occurred during an intrusion. Starting at a single detection 
point (e.g., a suspicious file), it identifies files and processes that could have affected that 
detection point and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. BackTracker is able to 
record every dependency-causing event among OS objects, and span up a dependency chain 
starting from one object. Complete information such as process forking, file operations, and 
program execution (which is important for security analysis), is recorded in a system-call 
oriented manner. 
4.4  Architectural Level Kernel Module 
The Intel Pentium-D processor provides us with adequate performance counters to 
illustrate the CPU’s dynamic performance profile. A kernel module is implemented to sample 
the performance counters in regular intervals. We set the sampling interval to 0.5s, balancing 
the tradeoff between system performance overhead and accuracy of monitored performance 
variation. Thus, at regular interval, the values of these four architectural counters which have 
most representative architectural variation under a DoS attack are recorded and dumped to a 
trace file. The timestamp recorded together with other performance counters is used to 
correlate architectural events with network connections parsed from tcpdump files. 
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4.4.1   Performance Monitoring Counters 
Performance monitoring is introduced in Pentium processor. A set of performance 
monitoring registers are provided to monitor or measure processor performance profile. The 
performance monitoring mechanism varies with processor families. The target system used in 
the experiment is installed with Pentium-D processor, which features Intel NetBurst 
Microarchitecture. 18 Performance Counter MSRs (PC MSR) are provided to count events. 
Each PC MSR is associated with one Counter Configuration Control Register (CCCR) to set 
up a specific counting method. Every PC MSR and CCCR pair is controlled by a subset of 45 
Event Selection Control Registers (ESCR). Table 4-1 lists the registers we need to use to 
sample CPU performance events. All registers are read/written using RDMSR, WRMSR, or 
RDPMC instruction. 
 
Table 4-1.  List of registers used to monitor CPU performance 
Register Name Function 
MSR Model Specific Register Monitor performance, debug system, 
enable/disable model specific functions, 
etc. 
PC MSR Performance Counter MSR Store actual event number 
ESCR Event Selection Control Register Select events to be monitored by 
specific PC MSR 
CCCR Counter Configuration Control 
Register 
Set up the associated performance 





Table 4-2.  PC MSR and control registers used to sample  
desired architectural events 



















A specific procedure needs to be followed to correctly configure the control registers and 
enable performance counters to count on the correct events: 
Step 1: Identify events to monitor. 
Step 2:  For each selected event, choose an ESCR which support the event. 
Step 3:  Identify the CCCRs and PC MSRs associated with the ESCRs. 
Step 4:  Set up ESCR with correct event mask and privilege level. 
Step 5:  Set up CCCR with correct ESCR mask. (Cascading and event filtering are  
optional) 
Step 6:  Set CCCR enable flag to start event counting. 
Step 7: Sample PC MSRs to poll out CPU performance profile. 
For those four architectural events we need to monitor, PC MSR and control registers 
listed in Table 4-2 need to be configured or sampled. 
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4.4.2   Implementation of Kernel Module 
Although RDPMC instruction is allowed to execute in all privilege levels, control 
registers have to be configured with WRMSR instruction, which can only be executed at 
privilege level 0. Thus, a kernel module, i.e. device driver, is implemented to manipulate on 
hardware registers, and obtain the information of system runtime performance variations. 
Linux kernel allows kernel modules to be loaded and unloaded at run time, without rebooting 
the system. It runs at privilege level 0 and has full access to all system devices.  
A virtual file under /proc directory is also created to dump out information from kernel 
space to user space. /proc is a virtual file system that contains a hierarchy of dynamic virtual 
files. Those files represent current status of the kernel. They allow users and applications to 
gain insight of system’s kernel status, and communicate configuration changes to the kernel. 
The implemented module creates two directories under /proc; they serve as an interface 
between kernel space and user space:  
/proc/perf_mon/setting:  Used to configure counter sampling 
/proc/perf_mon/event:  Used for user-mode application to poll out counter values.  
 
The /proc/perf_mon/setting entry supports four types of command: 
Start:  Initiate all ESCRs and CCCRs, place sampling routine on wait queue to  
periodically sample PC MSRs at predefined intervals. 
 Clear:  Set all control registers to zero, clear PC MSRs. 
 Stop:  Set all ESCRs and CCCRs to zero, stop event counting, but values in PC  
MSRs are still preserved. 
 Read:  Increment internal read number counter. 
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Once sampling routine is initiated, it will keep writing event numbers to the 
/proc/perf_mon/event entry buffer. Since memory space for a /proc entry is limited, we 
implemented a user mode application to flush all event numbers from /proc/perf_mon/event 







5.1  System Environment 
 We use an Intel Pentium-D PC installed with Redhat Linux 9.0 as target system, and 
another machine installed with Suse 10 as attacker/client system. Both machines are 
connected to a department LAN. Exploits are launched from attacker to target system. 
Network traffic information is captured with the tcpdump tool. 
5.2  Developed Denial-of-Service Exploits 
Nowadays more sophisticated techniques are emerging to escape IDS detections; in this 
work, we assume crackers have gained unauthorized access to the victim machine (they may 
only have non-privileged access), and then intend to launch local DoS daemons. To emulate 
this scenario, we design five local DoS exploits which are used to model local DoS exploits 
exhausting different system resources. Each exploit target a specific type of system resources, 
intentionally exhausting a particular resource, and rendering the system unavailable to 
legitimate users. Table 5-1 outlines the detailed descriptions of these exploits. First three 
attacks are traversing a certain memory space with the stride of the cache line size (64 bytes 
in our system). In this case, regardless of set associativity of data cache, constant cache miss 




Figure 5-1.  Pseudo code snipet for BSB DoS exploits 
 
Table 5-1.   The self-developed DoS exploits  
Attack Type Description 
L2 Cache DoS Target L2 cache, sweep through L2 cache space 
BSB DoS Target backside bus bandwidth, sweep through twice the L1 D$ size, 
saturate backside bus 
FSB DoS Target front-side bus bandwidth, sweep through twice L2 cache size, 
saturate front-side bus. 
Memory DoS Target memory space; keep allocating memory space, max out 
memory usage. 
Loop DoS Target CPU usage, infinite dummy instruction. 
 
Table 5-2.   Dataset construction 
Dataset Combination 
Training 1 l2 + bsb + fsb + mem 
Training 2 l2 + bsb + fsb + loop 
Training 3 l2 + bsb + mem + loop 
Training 4 l2 + fsb + mem + loop 
Training 5 bsb + fsb + mem + loop 
Testing l2  + bsb + fsb + mem + loop + noise 
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We launch these exploits multiple times over a LAN to obtain five different training 
datasets, each containing only four exploit types. Details of the training and testing sets 
construction are listed in Table 5-2.    
The testing dataset includes a full set of the above five exploit types, 25 attack instances 
in total, and is injected with noise traffic data of CPU or memory intensive operations such as 
tar, compile, scp etc. Those noises are included in order to evaluate the ability of the IDS to 
differentiate normal operation and attack traffic. In addition, we also include 3630 normal 
connections. 
5.3  Real-world Exploits 
Apart from our crafted exploits, we also evaluate our proposed scheme using mixed data 
with real-world remote DoS exploits, and dataset of real-world local DoS exploits. The 
descriptions of real-world remote DoS exploits in the experiment are outlined in Table 5-3, 
and description of those local DoS exploits are listed in Table 5-4. 
We divide the mixed data of hand-crafted exploits and real-world remote DoS expoits 
into five training datasets and one testing dataset. Training data contains partial set of all 
exploits, while the testing data contains a full set of all exploit types. Testing data also 
include significant amount of noise traffic, which is injected intending to evaluate the ability 
of the IDS to detect exploits never seen before and avoid the false alarms. 
The real-world local DoS exploits will be used separately to evaluate the ability of our 




Table 5-3.  Real-world remote DoS exploits 
Attack Description 
CVE-2003-0132 Apache memory leak, drains memory via large 
chunks of linefeed characters. 
CVE-2003-0543 OpenSSL integer overflow, causes Apache server to 
enter CPU intensive loop. 
CVE-2004-0493 Apache memory exhaustion. 
CVE-2004-0942 Apache multiple space header DoS, drains CPU 
resource. 
 
Table 5-4.  Real-world local DoS exploits 
Attack Description 
Memory leak local DoS - 1 Kernel vulnerability causing exhaustion of 
system memory resource, inducing system crash. 
Memory leak local DoS - 2 Kernel vulnerability allows non-privileged users 






Results and Analysis 
 
6.1  Performance Metrics 
We use the typical four measurments to evaluate performance of our IDS. True positive 
(TP) rate is the ratio of the number of correctly detected attacks and the total number of 
attacks. The true negative (TN) rate is the ratio of the number of normal connections and the 
total number of normal connections. The false positive (FP) rate is the ratio of the number of 
normal connections that are incorrectly classified as attacks and the total number of normal 
connections. False negative (FN) is the rate of missed attacks. 
 
Table 6-1.   Measurements of IDS System 
 Predicted Normal Predicted Intrusions 
Actual Normal 
Connection 
True Negative (TN) 
 




False Negative (FN) 
 





6.2  IDS Performance Comparison  
We conduct three sets of experiments, to evaluate the ability of different IDS schemes to 
identify simulated and real-world DoS exploits. 
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6.2.1  Evaluation with Developed Exploits 
Two sets of experimental results are shown to demonstrate how architectural events help 
to increate the true positive rate, and how OS events assist in decreasing false positives. 
6.2.1.1  Two Level Feature Sets 
Firstly, we train an IDS using the GBT model with only the application level features 
listed in Chapter 3. Results shown in Figure. 6-1 reveal that IDS built on the application 
features alone can only recognized around 30% of such DoS attacks (refer to the light bar 

























Figure 6-1.   Detection rate of IDS with one level and two level feature sets 
Table 6-2.   False alarm rate of IDS of one level and two level feature sets 
False Positive Rate ( % ) Training 
Set APP APP + ARCH 
1 0 0.19 
2 0 0.08 
3 0 0.19 
4 0 0.19 
5 0 0.19 
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sufficient to detect the DoS intrusions accurately. Over half of attack instances successfully 
escape from application level monitor.  
This result is expectable since we assume that our multi-step attacks can bypass the 
application level feature monitors and launch DoS exploits locally. The network connection 
behaves exactly the same as other normal connections. No typical properties such as traffic 
bursts of the DoS attacks could be observed at the application level. Therefore, the IDS can 
not differentiate them from other normal operations. 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of architectural monitors, we conduct another 
experiment with added architectural features. The results are illustrated in the gray bar group 
of Figure 6-1. From the figure, we can see that the capability to detect novel multi-step DoS 
attacks is greatly improved to an average of 91.2% by integrating  
ARCH features. For training set 3, 4 and 5, we achieve a detection rate almost to 100%.  
A few example records are shown in Table 6-3 to illustrate the different behaviors of 
malicious and benign operations monitored from multi-level features. For the ARCH event 
columns, we list the ratio of the numbers of the event during a session to a pre-measured 
normal session. The first entry is a normal ssh connection that is commonly seen in a local 
Table 6-3.  Sample records. The label is the actual attribute of the  
connection, pred_1 is prediction from APP framework, pred_2  
is the prediction result from APP+ARCH framework 
 






ssh   tcp  77.26    3993  2004    2.01  0.05  1.14  1.48    2.67  1.73  normal  normal  normal
ssh   tcp  355.16   0407  2148    0.77  0.05  55.75 3602.53  1.18  0.96  attack  normal   attack 
ssh   tcp  219.15  11393  3540    1.62  0.03  264.11 0.81    0.84  0.87  attack  normal   attack 





network. The next three entries are BSB, loop, memory DoS attacks. Each of them has 
manifest architectural variations (see the bolded italic numbers), but the application (APP) 
level features stay in the same pattern as a normal connection. This explains why in a 
sophisticated DoS attack scenario, intrusions can escape detection from APP level. The IDS 
built with APP features only can not distinguish such attacks from other normal sessions. 
Therefore, it lacks sufficient information to make a correct judgment. 
However, ARCH features also bring in false positives compared to pure APP feature 
framework as shown in Table 6-2. Even though the false positive rate is as low as an average 
of 0.17%, considering the amount of normal connections is large, over 3000 records, the 
actual number of false alerts is not negligible. The most challenging issue to integrate ARCH 
features into IDS is how to reduce false positives, since at ARCH level, memory or CPU 
intensive workloads, and malicious DoS attacks have similar characteristics which is difficult 
to differentiate at the this level. 
6.2.1.2  Three Level Feature Set 
To reduce false positives brought in by ARCH events, we first analyze the way by which 
crackers may log-in to the victim system. In practice, remote Buffer-Overflow (BoF) and 
guessing password are mainly used to gain unauthorized access to the target machine. After 
crackers gain illegal access to the victim system, a DoS attack may be launched. In this paper, 
we assume that an illegal user will conduct a BoF attack first to obtain access to the target 
system then start a DoS attack. In this scenario, we enforce the IDS with BoF detection 
capability with OS level monitors and then write prediction results into the system event log. 
We can distinguish between a normal heavy duty program and an illegal DoS attack in this 
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way: we search the event log and check if a BoF exploit was found in this connection before. 
If it was found and architectural events also show an abnormal pattern, we think that the 
system is under DoS attack; otherwise, we believe that there is a legal heavy duty program 
running on the target machine, i.e., the system is in a normal state. 
We conducted experiments integrating OS level features into the IDS to detect remote 
BoF attacks. The OS features we employed include: forked_socket_session, forked_shell, 
forked_from_shell, coincided_pid. Those features are obtained using BackTracker’s [9] 
system call tracking function embedded in the Linux kernel. Through an experiment, we 
achieve an average True Positive rate of 90.3%, True Negative rate of 99.6%. Detailed 
experiment procedure is elaborated in Appedix A. 
With the highly accurate BoF detection rate, we apply the results into DoS detections in 
the way described in the last paragraph to reduce false alarm rate induced by ARCH monitors. 
As shown in the last column of Table 6-4, the false positive rate is almost reduced to zero in 
all of the cases. The true positive rate is slightly affected as shown by the dark bar in Figure 
6-2.  But its average, 90.81%, is still considered as good performance in detecting 
sophisticated DoS attacks. 
Note that we only take BoF for example here, just to demonstrate that additional 
information could be utilized to reduce the false positives. Guessing password can also be 
accurately identified by extracting other information from the application payload data. 
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6.2.2  Evaluation with Mixed Dataset 
Apart from our crafted exploits, we also evaluate our proposed scheme using mixed data 
with real-world remote DoS exploits. Remote DoS exploits involve a simpler attack scenario. 
Attackers only need to initiate a one-step procedure: launch the attack against a target system 
remotely. Using this set of datasets, we intend to simulate a realistic situation that both 













1 2 3 4 5










APP APP  +  ARCH APP  +  ARCH  +  O S
 
Figure 6-2.  Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets 
Table 6-4.   False alarm rate of IDS for different feature sets 
False Positive Rate ( % ) Training 
Set APP APP + ARCH APP + ARCH + OS 
1 0 0.19 0.00051 
2 0 0.08 0.00022 
3 0 0.19 0.00051 
4 0 0.19 0.00051 
5 0 0.19 0.00051 
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be sophisticated, it will rarely contain only one type of attacks. The descriptions of real-world 
remote exploits in the experiment are given in Table 5-3.  
We also divide the data into five training datasets and one testing dataset. It is guaranteed 
that two exploit types are absent from the training data, while the testing data contains a full 
set of all exploits. A huge number of noise traffic is injected into the testing data. The 
strategy is intended to evaluate the ability of the IDS to detect exploits never seen before and 
avoid the false alarms. Results using mixed dataset (shown in Table 6-5) also prove the 
effectiveness of integrating architectural level features. In this experiment, the total number 
of normal connections is 9412 and the total number of attack instances of 472. 
6.2.3   Evaluation with Real-World Local Exploits 
Having shown how ARCH features benefits the IDS using our developed exploits, we 
test the system with two real-world local DoS exploits (Table 5-4) separately to further 
demonstrate the soundness of our work. These two exploits have been used by real hackers in 
the wild, to impair production servers. 
We use two sets of training data: one constructed with only the hand-crafted exploits, the 
Table 6-5.  Our IDS performance for mixed datasets 
# of False Alarms # of Missed Attacks Training 
Set APP APP + 
ARCH + OS
APP APP + 
ARCH + OS 
1 28 12 2 0 
2 33 11 2 0 
3 50 11 3 0 
4 36 17 2 0 
5 47 9 2 0 
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other one mixed with real-world remote DoS exploits (Table 6-6 and Table 6-7). Note that for 
both sets, first five training data only contains a subset of all exploit types, and the training 6 
contains a full set of all exploit types. 
 
Table 6-6.  Dataset constructed using developed exploits 
Dataset Combination 
Training 1 l2 + bsb + fsb + mem 
Training 2 l2 + bsb + fsb + loop 
Training 3 l2 + bsb + mem + loop 
Training 4 l2 + fsb + mem + loop 
Training 5 bsb + fsb + mem + loop 
Training 6 l2  + bsb + fsb + mem + loop 
 
 
Table 6-7.  Dataset constructed using mixed exploits 
Dataset Combination 
Training 1 l2 + bsb + fsb + mem + real_world_exploit 
Training 2 l2 + bsb + fsb + loop + real_world_exploit 
Training 3 l2 + bsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit 
Training 4 l2 + fsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit 
Training 5 bsb + fsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit 
Training 6 l2 + bsb + fsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit 
 
Figure 6-3 shows the comparison of True Positive rates using different training and 
testing datasets. Table 6-8 outlines the number of false alarms of different experimental sets. 
In Figure 6-3, group a’s results are based on training sets listed in Table 6-6, which are 
combinations of self-developed exploits. The APP + ARCH IDS achieves an average 
detection rate of 80.6% for Mem-leak-dos-1 attack, and 80.3% for Mem-leak-dos-2 attack 
(five out of six datasets have 100% detection rate). Meanwhile, the APP IDS’s average 




a(1)   Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-1 exploit 
 
a(2)    Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-2 exploit 
 
 
b(1)   Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-1 exploit 
 
b(2)   Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-2 exploit 
 
Figure 6-3.  IDS performance comparison (group a’s training data   consists 
of hand-crafted exploits, group b’s training data consists of mixed-data) 
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The reason why the APP + ARCH IDS detects none of the mem-leak-dos-2 exploit when 
trained using training set 2 is that the exploit type missing from the training set, which is 
mem-dos, has the exact same architectural features as the attack. Therefore, even though the 
IDS is well trained with other exploit types, it fails to detect this particular exploit efficiently. 
The result of training set 6 tells that when trained with full set of all exploit types, the IDS 
can accurately identify all intrusion instances. 
Table 6-8.  IDS performance comparison (in each table, left group of 
columns indicates the IDS is trained with self-developed exploits, right 
group’s training data is based on mixed datasets) 
 
a.  Number of false alarms for Mem-leak-dos-1 
# of False Alarms  




APP APP + ARCH APP APP + ARCH  
1 2 0 1 2 
2 1 0 1 0 
3 1 0 1 0 
4 1 0 1 0 
5 1 0 1 0 
6 1 0 1 0 
 
b.   Number of false alarms for Mem-leak-dos-2 
# of False Alarms  




APP APP + ARCH APP APP + ARCH  
1 1 0 1 2 
2 1 0 4 0 
3 2 0 2 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 
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For group b, which is trained with mixed datasets of developed and real-world remote 
exploits as listed in Table 6-7, the average TP rates for APP + ARCH IDS are 88.9% and 
100% for Mem-leak-dos-1 and Mem-leak-dos-2 separately; APP IDS can only detect 30.6% 
or none of those two types of attack instances. The injected real-world remote exploits in the 
training data improve the detection rate of APP + ARCH IDS as compared to group a. They 
remedy the degradation induced by absence of the mem-dos from the training data 2, since 
they bring in similar exploit types that have the same architectural behavior as the testing 
exploit. The 100% accuracy is obtained in attack detection using this set of training data. This 
indicates that with more comprehensive training data, our proposed IDS can achieve more 
accurate detection results.  
Number of false alarms is shown in Table 6-8 by grouping the results by the testing data. 
Table 6-8(a) lists the results for two sets of training data detecting mem-leak-dos-1 attack. 
The APP IDS raises an average of 1.17 or 1 false alarm for two training sets, and the APP + 
ARCH IDS raises 0.33 or no false alarm for those two training sets. When the volume of 
network traffic grows, the difference of number of false alarms raised by the two IDSs will 
increase significantly. Table 6-8(b) shows the average number of false positives for APP IDS 
is 1.17 and 1 tested using mem-leak-dos-2 exploit, while the average number is 0 and 0.33 for 
APP + ARCH IDS. 
In conclusion, the testing results also demonstrate that ARCH features are of significant 
use in identifying sophisticated DoS attacks. APP features alone can not reveal the intrusive 
behaviors by monitoring at the application level. By using our crafted exploits or real-world 
exploits, attackers can manage avoid detection by APP monitors, and directly induce drastic 
system performance degradation, with the APP monitors still showing everything is normal. 
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With addition of ARCH features, alarms will be triggered in this case because DoS attack can 
not be achieved without inducing numerous ARCH level activities. Even though attackers 




Related Work  
 
Modern DoS attacks employ many advanced and sophisticated techniques to amplify the 
damage and elude detections or mitigations of countermeasures. IP spoofing is widely 
adopted by hackers to mask the real source of attacks, or launch reflective DoS attacks; 
Distributed DoS is used to initiate attacks from multi-source; low-rate pulsing method is 
utilized to reduce average packet rate and evade network monitors. Based on a header 
analysis, frequency domain characteristics are studied to improve the IDS performance [3][6], 
a ramp-up behavior is also considered as a way to distinguish between single- or multi-source 
attacks. In [8][10], authors propose to take a spectral analysis to detect shrew attacks which 
consist of short time bursts repeating at a maliciously chosen low frequency. This kind of 
low-rate attack sends out packets at certain fixed intervals, to intentionally reduce the average 
packet rate, rendering the IDS unable to discover undergoing attacks. To defend against IP 
spoofings, various off-line IP trace-back techniques are proposed to pinpoint the real origin of 
DoS attack [17][18], some on-line countermeasures are also developed to filter out those 
spoofed packets, help sustain service availability during attacks: [7] presents a Hop-Count 
Filtering scheme to utilize the Time-to-Live(TTL) value in the IP header to filter out spoofed 
IP packets.  
Recent work on intrusion countermeasures include machine learning IDS techniques, 
alert correlation, alert fusion and feature analysis. Machine learning techniques, such as 
decision tree, neural network, Bayesian network, are applied to detect network intrusions. 
Alert correlation attempts to correlate IDS alerts based on the similarity between alert 
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attributes, previously known attack scenarios, or prerequisites and consequences of known 
attacks [16]. Alert fusion combines detection outputs of the same attack from different 
independent detectors. Feature Analysis tries to optimize the information gained from 
multiple dimensional features through feature bagging, relevance and redundancy analysis, 
and feature weight classification [11][13][14][23].  
In the HIDS literature, various techniques utilizing system call tracking and auditing trails 
are proposed. System call arguments are integrated to capture data-flow behaviors of 
programs, and improve attack detections in HIDS [2]. A policy-driven solution is presented 
in [1] to define and enforce process behavior rules controlling processes’ access to system 
resources. All system behaviors are monitored in real-time by a modified kernel. 
Basically, research works investigating DoS attack utilize sniffer-based methodologies. 
They only rely on analyzing network traffic information at the application level. These 
network-based schemes suffer from fast traffic, switched network, information encryption, 
and most importantly, they have little knowledge of what is really going on in the victim 
machine. Significant useful information on the victim host is neglected. HIDS against DoS 
attacks are not widely researched since it is difficult to find a generic and low-cost way to 
defend against such attacks. We propose to utilize the strong correlation of architectural 
behaviors with DoS attacks, and employ multi-layer features to construct an IDS model. 
Close to our work, Woo and Lee [22] have observed performance degradation of 
multi-threaded workload under architectural DoS attacks. However, they do not further study 
the correlation of architectural behavior and DoS attacks and apply into an IDS in identifying 
and preventing such attacks. In our work, we are exploring architecture features to enrich the 
existing feature set used for intrusion detection research and demonstrate its effectiveness in a 
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systematic approach. OS level system events are also employed in our integrated IDS to 
reduce the false alarms. R. Tao et al. [19] has proposed to use architectural features to 
improve sophisticated DoS attack detections, which is the basis of our work. We have 
extended the work and evaluated our IDS using more comprehensive datasets to further prove 






We have conducted experiments to demonstrate that an IDS using only application 
features failed to detect sophisticated DoS attacks because these attacks appear normal if their 
behaviors are only monitored by the application feature set.  In order to detect the missed 
DoS attacks, we use a combination of application, OS, and architecture feature set. Both 
hand-crafted exploits and real-world exploits are used to evaluate the soundness of the 
multi-level IDS. Our experimental results showed improved IDS performance. In summary, 
we propose the idea that if crackers use sophisticated schemes to evade defense, the 
architectural level behavior monitored in conjunction with application and OS level features 
provides us valuable information to improve the IDS against such DoS attacks.  
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Appendix A 
Buffer Overflow IDS 
 
1.  Background 
Buffer overflow is one of the most prevalent methods hackers utilize to obtain security 
breach. The basis for buffer overflow is that no built-it boundary check is imposed by certain 
programming languages, such as C, C++. The code shown in Figure 1 is a valid program that 





Figure 1.  Sample code of buffer overflow 
 
 
Generally the hacker would utilize the programming languages’ insufficient bound 
checking, store data beyond the boundaries of a fixed-size buffer. Adjacent memory locations 
would be overwritten with other buffers, variables, or program flow data, resulting in 
abnormal program behavior, such as memory exception, system crash, or security breach if 
deliberately exploited by malicious hackers. 
 
 45
2. Behavior of BoF Attacks 
Previous techniques detecting BoF attacks focus on parsing and analyzing the payload 
information during a connection, extract application level features, and feed the feature 
events to the statistical model to build the IDS. Such schemes highly rely on characteristics 
certain exploits exhibit and require comprehensive domain knowledge in feature construction. 
In our work, we propose an adaptive anomaly network IDS utilizing extracted features from 
the OS level together with application level features to gain higher accuracy. 
Unlike DoS attack, which involves huge number of certain activities, e.g. large amount 
of network requests, BoF attack generally exploits the vulnerability in a single connection by 
being embedded in the payload data. Network connection information from application level 
is not enough to identify and correlate attack sessions. We group network connections by 
src_ip:src_port <-> dst_ip:dst_port, and the remote buffer overflow will obtain a interactive 
shell session connected to a different port from which it originally launches the attack, 
resulting in multiple distinct network sessions which are difficult to identify the attack and 
correlate those distinct malicious connections. Analyzing the payload does not provide us 
useful information to solve the problem. Each exploit will exhibit different payload 
characteristic; they do not share a common pattern. Constructing features solely from the 
application level is possible, but extremely low efficient, because different exploits will need 
different features constructed accordingly, extensibility to cover novel attacks is not high, and 
requires extra time and work. However, from OS level, some typical abnormal behaviors of 
BoF attacks could be identified using BackTracker, which records every OS event. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example observed using BackTracker’s system call 
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Figure 3.   Execution flow of a sample BoF exploit 
 
tracking function. The highlighted system events exhibit abnormal behaviors that could assist 
us to identify BoF exploit. As shown in Figure 3, the execution flow of this BoF exploit 







Figure 2.  Observation of BoF exploit using BackTracker 
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Step 1:  Attacker connects to target system from network 
Step 2:  Malicious network connection spawn another different network session 
Step 3:  Obtain interactive shell session through the forked network session 
3.   System Call Tracking 
In our work, BackTracker’s OS level event logging and dependency tracking is utilized to 
extract the OS level features of each network connections. BackTracker discovers sequences 
of steps that occurred during an intrusion. Starting at a single detection point (e.g., a 
suspicious file), it identifies files and processes that could have affected that detection point 
and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. BackTracker is able to record every 
dependency-causing event among OS objects, and span up a dependency chain starting from 
one object. Complete information such as process forking, file operations, and program 
execution (which is important for security analysis), is recorded in a system-call oriented 
manner. That information could be utilized to provide a novel view of exploit behavior 
analysis from the OS level. 
4.   IDS Implementation 
We integrate both the application level and OS level features. The application features 
we find informative in the case of remote BoF attacks are: type, service, duration, 
size_from_server, size_from_client, packet_rate, wrong_checksum_rate. And we also add 
four OS features (Table 1) according to our observation from the OS level to improve the 




  Table 1.   OS level features 
Fearues Description 
forked_socket_session forked another network 
connection 
forked_shell forked  shell sessions 
forked_from_shell forked from another network 
connection 
coincided pid share a same pid as another 
different network connection 
 
 
These features in Table 1 are observable using a modified BackTracker. Modifications to 
BackTracker include attaching a timestamp to every system event; exporting detailed IP 
address and port number for socket sessions. With those changes, we can correlate high level 
network session records with system events recorded by BackTracker’s system call tracking 
function embedded in Linux kernel.  
5.   IDS Performance 
Exploits we used to train and test our BoF IDS are all from real-world. We successfully 
utilized those tools to exploit targeted software vulnerabilities, and obtained interactive shell 
sessions. Table 2 gives detailed information of BoF exploits we employed.  
The 60 exploit instances are divided into five training datasets, with one type of exploits 
absent from each training set. And the testing data include all types of BoF exploits. Testing 
result shown in Figure 4 demonstrates that OS level events help improve the accuracy of True 




Table 2.  Description of BoF exploits 
CVE Number Name Description 
CVE-2002-0177 Icecast AVLLib Buffer 
Overflow Vulnerability
Remote user may send arbitrary 
long string to the server, leading 
to a stack overflow and execution 
of user supplied code. Execution 






Anonymous user may corrupt 
sensitive locations in memory 
and execute arbitrary commands 
by passing excessive 
user-supplied data into a static 
buffer. 





A remote heap overflow could 
occur when handling 
user-supplied input for entry lines 
with 'modified' and 'unchanged' 
flags, possibly leading to 
arbitrary code execution. 
NA Dr.Cat Drcatd Multiple 
Buffer Overflow 
Vulnerabilities 
Unauthorized access and/or 
elevated privilege on the 
vulnerable system may be 
achieved by exploiting the 
vulnerability of insufficient 
boundary checks of some 





















APP APP + OS
 
Figure 4.     True Positive rate comparison 
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Appendix B 
Control Register Layout for Pentium D 
 
ESCR MSR: 
The layout of ESCR MSR is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
63               30             24          8   5    4    3   2  1  0 






USR   
 
Figure 1.  ESCR layout 
Bit 0-1: Reserved 
Bit 2: USR flag – set counter to count events when processor operates in user mode 
Bit 3: OS flag – set counter to count events when processor operates in privileged  
level. 
Bit 4: Tag enable – enable tagging of μops. 
Bit 5-8: Tag value field – select a tag value to associate with a μop. 
Bit 9-24: Event mask field – select events to count from event class selected 
Bit 25-30: Event select field – select a class of events to count. 
 
CCCR MSR: 
CCCR MSR controls the filtering and counting of events, together with interrupt 
generation. The layout of CCCR MSR is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  CCCR layout 
Bit 0-11: Reserved. 
Bit 12: Enable flag – enable events counting  
Bit 13-15: ESCR select – select the ESCR to be used to select the events to be  
counted. 
Bit 16-17: Reserved – must be set to 11B. 
Bit 18: Compare flag – enable filtering of the event counting. 
Bit 19: Complement flag – configure how the event count is compared with the  
threshold value. 
Bit 20-23: Threshold value – set the threshold value to be compared with. 
Bit 24: Edge flag – enable rising edge detection of filtering event counts. 
Bit 25: FORCE_OVF flag – force a counter overflow on every counter increment. 
Bit 26: OVF_PMI flag – enable a performance monitor interrupt (PMI) to be  
generated when the counter overflow occurs. 
Bit 30: Cascade flag – enable one counter in a pair to start counting when the other  
counter overflows. 
Bit 31: OVF flag – indicate that the counter has overflowed when set 
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